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Introduction
In a fascinating and controversial paper, Donohue and Levitt (2001, henceforth DL) suggest that the advent of legalized abortion in the 1970s is responsible for much of the steep and persistent drop in the crime rate during the 1990s. DL suggest two possible channels for a causal link between abortion and crime. First, holding current pregnancy rates constant, abortion lowers the total number of young people in populations 15-25 years later. Because young people are more likely to commit crimes than older ones, the criminal propensity of the future population falls, and crime declines. Far more controversial is DL's second suggested channel between abortion and crime. If unwanted children are more likely to commit crimes, abortion can lower crime by preventing the births of persons most likely to become criminals. Although the morality of abortion is controversial, DL correctly point out that the question of whether abortion reduces crime is purely empirical. Their paper provides evidence for a link between abortion and crime that operates via both channels outlined above. Their estimates imply that the availability of abortion reduced crime rates in the 1990s by as much as one-half. 1 DL's paper has incited a storm of criticism from people who believe that the authors are making a normative claim about the social benefits of legalized abortion. We are also critical of DL's paper, but for purely empirical reasons. We show that when examined correctly, there is no evidence in DL's own data for the second channel they outline for an abortion-crime link. In other words, there are no statistical grounds for believing that the hypothetical youths who were aborted as fetuses would have been more likely to commit crimes had they reached maturity than the actual youths who developed from fetuses carried to term. Abortion may lower crime by reducing the overall number of young persons in the population (that is, via the first channel DL specify). Yet because only one channel operates in the abortion-crime link, the overall impact of abortion on crime would be smaller than DL claim.
This comment is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the statistical issues important for testing an abortion-crime relationship. Section 3 discusses the key test that DL performed to test their claim. First, we show that this test included an apparently inadvertent but serious computer programming error. Second, we argue that DL's choice of analyzing total rather than per capita criminal activity in this test was inappropriate, even though the population data needed for a per capita analysis are imperfect. Section 4 shows that when their error is corrected and a per capita analysis is performed, evidence for DL's second channel vanishes. Section 5 and a data appendix conclude the paper.
Statistical Issues in Testing the Abortion-Crime Link
The statistical issues related to testing an abortion-crime link are the same as those that arise in any test of cause and effect, such as whether a new drug is effective in combating a certain illness. Researchers testing drugs typically use randomized trials, in which test subjects suffering from an illness are randomly separated into two groups. A "treated" group is given the drug while the "control" group is given a placebo. After a suitable period, the average incidence of the disease is compared across the two groups.
If the treated group has a lower incidence than the untreated group (and this difference is "statistically significant," or too large to have easily occurred by chance), researchers conclude that the drug is effective in treating the disease.
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Randomization in drug trials is useful because it virtually eliminates the possibility that any improvement in the treated group is due to some confounding factor. Say that people suffering the disease become healthier when the weather is warm. In a randomized drug trial, we would be sure that any improvement in the treated group was due to the drugnot the weather -because randomization would insure that the weather facing the typical control patient was the same as that facing the typical treated patient. Researchers would not even have to know about all of the potential confounding factors that could influence patient outcomes. Randomization would eliminate the effects of any confounding factor that did exist.
DL test the abortion-crime link by comparing the criminal behaviors of different groups of young people. For obvious reasons, these groups are not formed as part of randomized trials. The groups are instead defined by their birth years and states of residence. Defining the groups in this way generates variation in "abortion exposure," or the abortion rate relevant for a particular cohort of young people.
3 DL point out that cohorts with high levels of abortion exposure are likely to contain fewer unwanted or mistimed children than groups with low abortion exposure. They test whether these high-exposure groups are also less likely to commit crime. (15-year-olds, 16-year-olds, etc., up to 24-year-olds) .
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Because DL have several points of data within each state-year combination, they can test for the abortion-crime link in a way that will not be contaminated by state-year effects.
5 The first paper to notice this correlation is Shimer (2001) .
6 The figure graphs Massachusetts unemployment and youth shares minus the national means of these variables. These are the relevant concepts for a state-level study of the demographic determinants of unemployment. Because of the aging of the baby boom generation, the actual youth share in Massachusetts is trending down over this period, as it is in all U.S. states.
7 State-year factors were also important in other states during this period. Among all states, the average correlation between unemployment and youth shares is strongly negative from 1973-1996, just as in the Massachusetts case. But this correlation essentially disappears if the sample period is extended to 2002. This disappearance suggests that the original correlation does not reflect a causal effect of the youth share, but rather a chance pattern of state-year effects across the country.
A well-known way to do this is as follows: First, calculate the mean levels of both abortion exposure and criminal activity across age groups within each state and year.
9 Then, subtract the relevant state-year means from the original, age-specific data. Finally, look for a statistical relationship between de-meaned crime and de-meaned abortion exposure.
Removing state-year means from the abortion and crime data removes any confounding effect that affects all ages within a state equally (that is, that operates on the state-year level). If we continued to find a negative relationship between abortion and crime in the de-meaned data, we would be safe in surmising that this relationship was not being driven by a confounding state-year effects.
In addition to controlling for state-year effects, we can also control for confounding effects that operate on the age-year level. An age-year factor would affect, say, all 19-yearolds in the United States in 1989, or all U.S. 15-year-olds in 1992. Controlling for age-year effects would require "de-meaning the de-meaned data," this time from age-year means.
Finally, we might still be concerned that any relationship between abortion and crime in the twice-de-meaned data could be due to a confounding effect that operated on the stateage level. Such an effect would be present if, say, 15-year-olds in Ohio were more likely to commit crimes than 19-year-olds in Texas. A third and final round of de-meaning, this time from state-age means, would clean the data of state-age effects, and effectively isolate the causal impact of abortion on crime.
In short, organizing data along the state-year-age level allows the researcher to eliminate any confounding effect that varies along any two of these levels (that is, state-year, ageyear, and state-age). Virtually all confounding effects would be expected to operate in one of these three ways. Therefore, if we still detected a negative relationship between abortion and crime after three rounds of de-meaning, we could be reasonably sure that this relationship was not due to a confounding factor. Importantly, we would not need to know the source of these state-year, age-year, or state-age effects. They could be due to the emergence of crack in the 1980s and 1990s, the proliferation of video games, a general breakdown in social morals, changing unemployment rates, or anything else. As long as the confounding factors affected the appropriately defined means of criminal activity, they
would not contaminate a study of cause and effect using de-meaned data.
While this process would clearly be tedious if done by hand, modern tools of multiple regression analysis will de-mean the data appropriately when state-year, age-year, and/or state-age effects are specified in the analysis. In practice, a multiple regression is simply a mathematical statement that the variable being explained (here, criminal behavior of a group of young people) depends on our independent variable of interest (abortion exposure) and whatever "controls" we enter (state-year, age-year, and state-age). Including the controls in the regression automatically de-means the data appropriately. The regression calculates an estimated effect for each independent variable, taking into account the various controls. Typically, running a regression with modern statistical software is done with a single line of computer code.
DL's Main Statistical Test: Two Criticisms
Our first criticism of DL's paper is that in an apparent mistake, they did not include state-year controls in their regressions. Therefore, any confounding effects that vary along the state-year level potentially contaminate their estimated effects. 10 This contamination is potentially serious, because the crack wave waxed and waned during the sample period, and by all accounts, crack affected different states at different times and with differing levels of severity. As a result, the crack wave probably generated effects on crime that varied on the state-year level.
Indeed, Joyce (2004) argues that DL (2001) confuse the effects of abortion on crime with the crack wave (though he does not mention the omission of state-year controls in DL's main regression). Joyce suggests a different way of identifying the effect of abortion that uses data organized on the state-year level, not the state-year-age level, and that focuses more closely on cohorts born around 1973. In their response to Joyce, DL (2004) rebut a number of his arguments, returning at the end to their regression that uses data on the state-year-age level. They correctly point out that tests performed on these data are to be preferred to other identification strategies, including Joyce's, because tests using state-year-age data can control for so many potentially confounding factors:
In this equation, the subscript s indexes the individual state, b indexes the cohort's birth year, and t indexes the year in which the criminal activity is being measured. ABORT sb is the abortion exposure of the cohort born in state s in birth year b. DL's error is that there is nothing in their computer code to reflect the θ st term, which represents the state-year controls. The computer code in question (as well as the data DL used in their paper) can be found at Donohue's Yale University web page: http://islandia.law.yale.edu/donohue/pubsdata.htm.
Because of the richness of the data (the variation is at the level of statecohort-year, rather than simply state-year), we are able to control for national cohort effects, national year effects, and (in some specifications) state-age interactions in crime rates (DL [2004] , p. 45).
Note that this paragraph omits any discussion of state-year effects, which, as we have seen, can also be controlled for using DL's data and which were supposed to have been included in their original paper. This omission is puzzling. ln(Crime csy ) = βAbort cs + θ c + γ sa + γ y + ǫ cst , where c, s, y, and [a], represent cohort of birth, state, year, and age, respectively. In the paper, the "a" in square brackets is printed as "α," presumably because of a printing error. There are no state-year controls in this specification (that is, there is no term subscripted by both "s" and "t" like the θ st term in the equation in Footnote 10).
be flawed. For our statistical tests, we use a modified population data set constructed by the National Cancer Institute (SEER, 1969 (SEER, -2002 . While even these data may not be perfect, we believe that it is inappropriate to simply ignore the population data, given the importance of a per capita analysis to the controversial question at hand.
Re-estimating DL's Test
Correcting DL's programming error is straightforward, because adding state-year controls requires only that we rewrite a line of computer code for each regression. estimates by single year of age. We discuss the SEER data more extensively in the Data Appendix.
Our estimates of the effects of abortion exposure and population size on arrests are presented in Table 1 (violent crime arrests) and Table 2 (property crime arrests). The variable to be explained in each regression is either the natural log of the total number of arrests for the age-state-year observation (columns 1-3) or the log of arrests per capita (column 4). All regressions in the tables include age-year controls. 15 As in DL (2001), the regressions include state-age effects where designated (row 1 excludes the state-age effects; row 2 includes them). As for the crucial state-year controls, they are left out of the regressions in column 1 (to facilitate comparison with DL's papers), then added in columns 2-4. 16 The numbers in parentheses below each estimated effect are the estimated 13 All of our data and programs are available on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
14 We obtained these data from SEER's web site: http://seer.cancer.gov/popdata/.
15 In addition, the regressions always include controls for fixed state-level effects. These controls differ from the state-year controls discussed above because they account only for state-level effects that are constant throughout the sample period. For example, entering state fixed controls means that the estimated abortion-crime relationship will not be affected by the fact that crime is always higher in some states than others. By contrast, state-year effects sweep out effects that imply some states will have crime rates that are temporarily higher than others. Because factors like the crack wave are expected to wax and wane over time, their confounding effects can only be removed by state-year controls, not by fixed state controls. When state-year controls are added to the regression, the fixed state controls become redundant. 16 The estimates in column 1 of our tables differ slightly from the corresponding regression in Table VII standard errors. These are inverse indicators of the statistical precision of each estimated effect; small standard errors signal a high degree of confidence that we have estimated the corresponding effect precisely.
17 If the absolute value of the estimated effect is larger than twice the value of the standard error, it is unlikely that the estimated effect is being generated by chance, so the estimate is said to be statistically significant.
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Results
The wide variety of estimates in Table 1 and Table 2 can seem bewildering at first glance. Depending on the specification, the estimated abortion effect is sometimes significantly negative, sometimes significantly positive, and sometimes very close to zero. This subsection applies some basic tenets of regression analysis to choose our preferred estimates by a process of elimination.
First, the state-age interactions ought to be included in the analysis; therefore, we should focus on the second row of each (2001), because we are using an updated data set made available by DL. Our sample period extends though 1998; theirs extends through 1996.
17 Standard errors tend to be small when the number of explanatory variables in the analysis (for example, abortion exposure, population, and the various sets of controls) do a good job in explaining the dependent variable (arrests or arrests per capita). Standard errors also tend to be small when there are only a few explanatory variables in the analysis. Adding more explanatory variables to a regression with a given amount of data often means that the effect of each variable will be estimated less precisely. Only if the additional variables greatly reduce the overall prediction error of the analysis will they shrink the standard errors.
18 To be specific, the estimated effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level when the ratio is equal to or greater than 1.96. This means that if the relationship were generated by chance, the data would generate a ratio greater than 1.96 only 5 percent of the time. Larger values of the ratio mean that the estimate is significant at higher levels of significance (for example, 1 percent).
19 The single exception is the first column of Third, the number of arrests in an observation rises with the number of persons in the observation, so we should focus on columns 3 and 4, where population is included in the analysis. When entered by itself (column 3), the population variable is always significant at a very high level, confirming the commonsense notion that arrests for a group of young people will rise if the number of people in the group goes up. Columns 3 and 4 include the population data in some way (either as an explanatory variable or in the construction of per capita arrests). Our preferred estimates will be in one of these two columns.
Finally, the per capita analysis in column 4 is to be preferred to column 3, where population is entered as a separate explanatory variable. This decision warrants some discussion. After all, the coefficient on log population is only 0.670 in Table 1 and 0.603 in Table 2 . If arrests were strictly proportional to population, so that a per capita analysis is appropriate, the population effects would theoretically equal 1.00. 22 How can we justify using per capita data when the estimated population effects in column 3 are so low?
The answer lies in DL's very criticism of the population data, namely, that these data are likely to be measured with error. Standard econometric theory implies that under classical conditions, the estimated effect for a mismeasured variable will be biased, or "attenuated," toward zero. Thus, if the true coefficient were 1.00, we should expect an estimated effect that is smaller than 1.00 if population is mismeasured. Given the likely presence of measurement error, DL's choice is to ignore the population data and leave them out of the regression. To us, this seems ill-advised. Not only is there undoubtedly 21 Specifically, the effect moves from -.0271 to -.0094 in Table 1 and from -.0283 to -.0096 in Table 2 .
22 An estimated effect of 1.00 would be expected for population because the data have been transformed into natural logarithms. Mathematically, running the regression in logs performs the analysis in percentage terms. Thus, an estimated effect of 1.00 means that a 1 percent increase in population would raise arrests by 1 percent. This is the definition of strict proportionality.
some relationship between arrests and population, the only way to determine whether the youths who would have developed had they not been aborted as fetuses would have been more likely to commit crimes is to see whether per capita propensities for criminal behavior decline as abortion exposure rises. Moreover, even the mismeasured population data enter very significantly in the regression. The relevant population effects in column 3 are each more than eight times the size of their corresponding standard errors.
The good news is that there is a way to reduce the effect of measurement error on our analysis. Well-known results in econometrics suggest that, again under classical conditions, measurement error does not result in attenuation bias when it appears in the variable to be explained (arrests) rather than in a variable doing the explaining (population).
23 Performing the analysis on a per capita basis puts the measurement error in the least damaging place, because it imports it into the arrests measure. The new variable to be explained will be (the natural log) of arrests divided by population, or arrests per capita. Therefore, beginning with a null hypothesis that arrests should be proportional to population, the per capita results in column 4 will be unbiased tests of the abortion-crime relationship. In our view, this is a better way to proceed than DL's choice to omit the population data altogether.
This process of elimination suggests that we choose the estimates in the second rows, fourth columns, for our preferred estimates. These estimates (-.0002 for violent crime and -.0004 for property crime) are small and statistically indifferent from zero. This is the source of our claim that DL do not provide evidence that legalized abortion has reduced the individual propensity to commit crime.
Robustness checks
We conducted three sets of robustness checks on our regressions. First, we re-estimated all regressions with population using the Census Bureau's original intercensal state-age- All that these similarities tell us, however, is that the SEER corrections are not driving our results. The similarities cannot tell us whether the original population data are so good as to need few corrections, or so bad as to be beyond hope. Still, the high degree of statistical significance for the population effects in column 3 suggests that some population measure should be incorporated into a study of abortion exposure and arrests. It turns out not to matter which population data are used.
Second, we re-estimated our preferred regressions without the state population weights that both we and DL (2001) We aggregate SEER's county-, and race-specific data to state-year-age estimates.
The SEER data are based on "postcensal" estimates of population, which are originally constructed by the Census Bureau. To calculate postcensal estimates, the Census takes as a base a full decennial census count (for example, the 1990 Census). Then it uses birth rates, death rates, aging rates, and estimates of interstate migration to estimate state-byage population for each of the 10 years after the full census. These estimates are of interest to a wide variety of researchers in social science and public health. Ingram, et al. (2003) describe the method for deriving the bridged intercensal estimates.
The method is based on distributing the error of closure over the entire decade. For any subgroup, the new population estimate is expressed as a function of time, the 2000 Census figure, and the original postcensal estimate for that group. The mathematical expression is:
where t is the time elapsed since April 1, 1990 (in days), P t is the bridged intercensal estimate at time t, Q t is the original postcensal estimate for time t, P 3653 is the April 1,
The NCHS and Census Bureau, with help from the National Cancer Institute (NCI), used this method to create bridged-race intercensal data for the 1990s (National Center for
Health Statistics, 2004) . The NCI, authors of the SEER data, made a further modification by re-estimating the population figures for Hawaii, due to concerns that undercounts were particularly large in this state. These revisions make the SEER data for Hawaii slightly different from the bridged intercensal estimates from the Census Bureau and NCHS. 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Unemployment Rate Tables 1 and 2 : A single asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two asterisks denote 1 percent significance). Results correspond to regressions of arrest rates for age-state-year observations on abortion exposure, current population, and various controls. Age-year controls are always included; state-age controls are included in the second rows. State-year controls are included in columns 2-4. The sample includes the 50 states plus the District of Columbia over the period 1985-1998 for 15-24 year-olds. The number of observations is 6,724 in the violent crime regressions and 6,730 in the property crime regressions. Data are not available for some states in some years. As in DL (2001), the abortion exposure relevant to the cohort of age a in state s in year y is the number of abortions per 1,000 live births in state s in year y − a − 1. The first column replicates the odd-numbered columns of Table VII (DL 2001) , using an updated data set from Donohue's internet site. As in DL (2001) , state population weights are always used, and standard errors account for the error correlation for a given cohort in a particular state over time.
